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Il'J THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
DENOH JONES, 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 
15705 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The Appellant was charged by information with the 
crime of "Distribution for Value a Controlled Substance," 
a second-degree Felony under Title 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii), Utah 
Code Annotated, 1953. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The case was tried to a jury with the Honorable 
Calvin Gould presiding. The appellant was found guilty of 
the offense charged in the information, and was sentenced 
to the Utah State Prison for a term not to exceed fifteen 
(15) years. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant requests that the verdict be set 
aside and the District Court be ordered to dismiss the 
charge. In the alternative, the appellant requests a 
new trial. 
STATEMEHT OF FACTS 
The appellant was charged with selling a quantity 
of heroin to Annette Stubbs on October i7, 1977. Annette 
Stubbs was an undercover agent for the Ogden City Police 
Department, and the alleged transaction was set up to be 
a controlled buy. 
The State's Evidence, in substance, was that Annett; 
Stubbs met with six police officers at about 10:30 p.rn. on 
October 17, 1977. The two female officers conducted a strip 
search of Annette Stubbs. After the search, Annette was 
given two 3-cc syringes and sixty ($60.00) dollars. Annette 
then made a phone call which she claimed was to the appellant 
and supposedly received permission to come down to his house. 
Annette was dropped off at a location approximately a block 
and a half from the appellant's home, and she walked the re~ 
of the way. She entered Mr. Jones' home at 11:37 p.m., exite 
at 11: 52 p .m., and walked back to where she had been dropped 
off. When she met with the police, she returned the two 
syringes. One of them contained a substance later identif~ 
-2-
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as heroin. (Tr. 14-32) None of the police officers were able 
to testify as to what went on inside the appellant's home 
(Tr., 36, 47, 54, 61). The only evidence in the trial that 
implicated the appellant was the testimony of Annette Stubbs. 
FACTS CONCER..'HllG AH;~ETTE STUBBS 
At the time of the trial, Annette Stubbs was 18 years 
of age (Tr. 69). She is an admitted prostitute and heroin 
addict (Tr. 73). At the age of 12, she started running away 
from home (Tr. 71), and she spent two years, off and on, in 
the State Hospital at Provo after she turned 12 (Tr. 102). 
At the age of 15, she was committed to the State Industrial 
School (Tr. 15). 
In March of 1977, Annette went to Pocatello, Idaho, 
with Colleen Searle and Richard Cottrell. The purpose of the 
trip was to get her started as aprostitute. She claims that 
it was during that trip that she first started to use heroin 
(Tr. 102-104). 
prostitution. 
During 1977, Annette was arrested twice for 
In August of 1977, Ms. Stubbs met Gerald Burnette 
at a restaurant in Ogden. At the time of the meeting, she 
di<l not know he was a police officer, but during their first 
conversation, Mr. Burnette informed her- that he worked for the 
Narcotics uivision of the Ogden Police Department. He also 
informed her that she should get off the streets and stop 
prostituting; and that if she didn't stop, he would put the 
-3-
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
 Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
word that she was a police informant. At the conclusion of 
their initial conversation, Mr. Burnette rented a motel room 
for the weekend for Ms. Stubbs' use, with the understanding 
that she would "clean up her act" and go home to her parents. 
She did neither, and on September 21, 1977, Mr. Burnette saw 
her again and made an appointment to talk to her later that 
night. She missed the appointment, but went to the police 
station the next night and agreed to become an undercover 
agent (Tr. 143-145). The Police Department agreed to pay her 
$150.00 for every person she could bust. In addition, they 
covered her living expenses. The total amount expended on 
this operation up to the date of the trial was $6,400.00, 
and the Department still owed Annette $900.00, less amounts 
advanced of $224.00 on her fee (Tr. 167-169). 
Ms. Stubbs further acknowledged that, while workinc 
under cover, she continued to buy and shoot heroin without 
telling the police about it. She said she saved part of her 
grocery allowance to buy heroin (Tr. 9 3) • She further testi-
fied that she did not tell the police about shooting heroin 
while working for them until she was tripped up in Court 
(Tr. 126-127). 
Annette's testimony about the alleged buy on Octobe 
17, 1977, was that she went in the house, bought two ballo~ 
of heroin from Mr. Jones, prepared a syringe, and shot a port· 
-4-
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of it into her arm and saved some for analysis (Tr. 80-87). 
She further acknowledged that her prior contacts with Mr. Jones 
were such that she had many opportunities to plant heroin in 
his house (Tr. 131). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE STATE OFFERED AND THE COURT ADMITTED EVIDENCE OF ALLEGED 
ACTS OF THE APPELLANT UNREALTED TO THE CHJ'RGE FOR WHICH HE 
WAS BEING TRIED, nm IN DOING so, THE STATE AND THE COURT 
DEGRADED THE CHARACTER OF THE APPELLANT IN THE EYES OF THE 
JURY. 
Prior to the commencement of the trial, the 
prosecuting attorney was aware that his entire case turned 
on the testimony of Annette Stubbs and her credibility. From 
that standpoint, the prosecution made every effort to degrade 
and humiliate the appellant in an attempt to make Annette 
Stubbs look better than she was. 
The tone of the trial started with Mr. Gladwell's 
opening statement when he stated, "The sale of heroin is an 
obnoxious, disgusting activity. It is an offense to you 
and I. It is a blight on our community." (Tr. 4). True as 
Mr. Gladwell's statement may have been, it was an inappropriate 
and inpermissable argument to be making in an opening statement. 
-5-
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Appellent's Counsel was aware of the Prosecution's 
intent to try to degrade the character of the appellant throus 
the testimony of Annette Stubbs. Therefore, prior to her tes-
timony, a Motion was made to the Court to limit such testimon;· 
and to have the prosecution make a proffer as to its intent 
and purpose. The Court denied the Motion for a Limitation 
Order (Tr. 62-68). As a part of that Motion, the appellant 
acknowledged that there was no issue of Entrapment. (Tr. 62-63). 
Mr. Gladwell acknowledged that his proposed evidence might 
have a tendency to inflame the jury (Tr. 66). 
Following the denial of the Motion and at the point 
in Ms. Stubbs' testimony where it became relevant, appellant's 
objection was again made and denied (Tr. 77). 
Ms. Stubbs then testified that she started buying 
drugs fro:::n Mr. Jones when she first met him (Tr. 7 7) , and tha: 
other people around his house were involved in heroin additio: 
(Tr. 79). Then, the prosecution er.'\barked on the following 
line of questioning involving prostitution (starting at Tr.~ 
line 21) : 
Q. Did you ever conduct yourself as a prostitute 
in his residence? 
A. I did. 
Mr. SEARP~ Well, now, I am going to object 
on that point, Your Honor. At this point heroin 
is one thing, but trying to bring in other offen~ 
that are unrelated to the charge is just an attern: 
to inflame the minds of the jury, and that's all 
the prosecution is doing, trying to in effect s~ 
-6-
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ltr. Jones is a sinful person and if he didn't do 
this on this day, you ought to convict him anyway 
because of all the other stuff he did. I contend 
it is prejudicial, improper, and he shouldn't be 
allowed to go into it. 
MR. GLADWJ:::L:L,: That's not the case, your Honor. 
THE COURT: Well, Mr. Gladwell, he has my ruling 
anc he is overruled. 
l1R. GLADl'lELL : Thank you. 
Q. And on how many occasions did that--did you act 
as a prostitute in his residence? 
A. Four or five times. 
Q. Now just how would that occur? Would you bring 
the individials to his-home? 
A. Yes, I would. 
Q. And then what would happen ·once you reached the 
residence? 
A. He would go in the back bedroom, and I would give 
Denon Jones $5.00. 
Q. What would you give him $5.00 for? 
A. For the room, to use the room. And then after 
I was done, with the money that I had got from the 
man that I was with, I would buy heroin, if he had 
it. 
Q. How long did this relationship that you had with 
Denon Jones continue? 
A. Up until the arrests were made." 
Appellant contends that the admission into evidence of 
the above statements were prejudicial to the appellant and were 
in violation of Rules 47 and 55 of the Rules of Evidence, which 
read as follows: 
-7-
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"RULE 47. CHARACTER TRAIT AS PROOF OF CONDUCT 
Subject to Rule 48, when a trait of a person's 
character is relevant as tending to prove his 
conduct on a specified occasion, such trait may 
be proved in the same nanner as provided by 
Rule 46, except that (a) evidence of specific 
instances of conduct other than evidence of 
conviction of a crime which tends to prove 
the trait to be bad shall be inadmissible, and 
(b) in a criminal action evidence of a trait 
in an accused's character as tending to prove 
his guilt or innocence of the offense charged, 
(i) may not be excluded by the judge under 
Rule 45 if offered by the accused to prove 
his innocence, and (ii) if offered by the 
prosecution to prove his guilt, may be admitted 
only after the accused has introduced evidence 
of his good character. 
RULE 55 OTHER CRIMES OR CIVIL WRONGS 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person 
committeu a crime or civil wrong on a specified 
occasion, is inadmissible to prove his dispo-
sition to commit crime or civil wrong as the 
basis for an inference that he committed 
another crime or civil wrong on another specified 
occasion but, subject to Rules 45 and 48, such 
evidence is aclmissible when relevant to prove 
some other material fact including absence of 
mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity." 
As noted in the last sentence of Rule 47, such 
evidence is not admissible unless the accused has introducec 
evidence of his good character. At the point of Annette 
Stubbs' testimony, the defendant had not testified or put on 
any evidence. In fact, as a part of the Motion in Limi ta tic 
the appellant's Counsel acknowledged to the Court that a 
final decision had not been made as to whether or not the 
defendant would testify (Tr. 67). 
-8-
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As to the exceptions noted in Rule 55, to-wit: 
absence of mistake, accident, motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge, or identity, Ms. Stubbs' 
testimony about prostitution had nothing to do with any 
of the above exceptions. 
This Court has further noted a further exception 
to the general rule when entrapment is raised as a defense 
State v~ Perkins, 19 Utah 2nd 421, 432 P2d 50, 1967, however, 
as a part of the Motion in Limitation, Counsel for appellent 
specifically disclaimed an entrapment defense (Tr. 62~63). 
The Case Law in Utah is very supportive of Appellant's 
position: 
In State v. Torgerson, 4 Utah 2d 52, 286 Pzd 800, 
1955, this Court said, 
"The rule on tnat subject in this state is 
that such evidence which has probative 
value to prove a material issue is . admissible 
unless offered only to si1ow evil or criminal 
disposition." 
One of the exceptions referred to in the Rules is 
when there is an identity issue, and as noted in State~ 
~cHe~ry, 7 Utah 2d 289, 323 P2d 710, 1958, wherein this 
Court noted: 
"It is true evidence of a prior crime is as a 
general rule not admissible in the prosecution of 
an accused for a charged offense.I An exception 
to this rule exists in instances when such 
evidence tends to aid in the identification of 
-9-
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of the defendant presently charged. The caveat 
is made, however, that if identity can be 
clearly shown without such evidence it should 
not be admitted as its only effect would then 
be to prejudice the jury, inferring present 
guilt from past unrelated activity." 
It should be noted that as a part of the Motion in 
Limitation, Counsel for appellant ackn0wledged that there was 
no issue of identity in that Ms. Stubbs and Mr. Jones knew 
each other very well. Therefore, there was no identity iss~. 
The general rule again relied upon by this Court in 
State v. Dickson, 12 Utah 2d8, 361 P 2d 412, 1961, reversed 
the trial Court. Also in support of this position, see Stab 
v. Lopez, 22 Utah 2nd 257, 451 P 2d 772, 1969; State v. Maso: 
Utah 2d 
Utah 2d 
, 530 P2d 795, 1975; State_v. Brown, 
, 577 P 2d 135, 1978; State v. Green, Utd 
I 579 p 2d 512, 1978. 
Appellent feels that State '!_'._Goodliffe, ___ Utah: 
P2d Case No. 15363 filed May 1, 1978) i 
very much in line with appellant's contention, wherein the ccj 
says" 
"The rules of evidence require rejection of 
evidence of specific behavior to prove a 
character trait except evidence of conviction 
of crirne.2 The Rule, of Course, is different 
where the evidence of other crimes or civil 
wrongs is relevant to prove some other material 
fact such as motive, opportunity, intent, 3 preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. 
-10-
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In the instant case, the State made no contention 
at trial that it sought to admit evidence of 
prior "complaints" for any purpose other than 
to rebut defendant's evidence of his truthfulness 
and veracity. The record also revea~s that the 
Court admitted into evidence for that purpose; 
yet, the clear implication of the testimony was that 
it was an attempt to demonstrate defendant's 
propensity to commit sexual crimes of the nature 
he is presently charged with. 
Bare, unproven allegations or "complaints" of 
prior incidents of similar conduct have no rele-
vancy to the issue of defendant's truthfulness or 
veracity. The admission-of such evidence without 
f~rther expalanation could only have caused the 
jury to speculate about defendant's propensities 
to commit such crimes and confuse the issues, all 
to the prejudice of defendant, which necessitates 
a new trial." 
After the State rested, a decision was made to have 
appellant testify partially in an attempt to let him defend 
his own character, which had been extremely damaged by the 
unsupported allegations of Annette Stubbs. 
In his testimony he acknowledged that he had been 
a resident of Ogden since 1955, and had held a job at Hill 
Air Force Base for 23 years. He dad befriend Annette Stubbs, 
and he tried to get her off heroin, which Annette also 
acknowledged (Tr. 113). He also gave her money to go home 
to her parents so she could get away from the people with 
whom ::he was associating (Tr. 180). Annette did acknowledge 
taking money from him to go home on, but said it was for a 
visit. Mr. Jones further denied being involved in selling 
any heroin to Annette, or to anyone else. 
-11-
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CONCLUSION 
Appellant contends that he was so improperly 
prejudiced by the unsupported allegations of the prosecution 
witness that he could not possibly receive a fair trial. 
l~tlEREFORE, the appellant prays that the Court reverse the 
trial and order the natter dismissed, or in the alternative, 
to order a new trial. 
Respectfully submitted by the Attorney for the 
appellant, 
-12-
H. DON SHARP 
550 - 24th St. Suite 304 
Ogden, Utah 84401 
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